Hello! I am a research fellow of the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica (IPSAS), Taiwan. My research focuses on comparative and international political economy, comparative authoritarianism, and Chinese politics. I am particularly interested in economic statecraft and media dynamics in authoritarian regimes. In addition, I am conducting research on how Taiwanese citizens perceive cross-Strait relations and national security issues. You can find my published works here.
I received my B.A. from National Chengchi University (NCCU), M.A. from NCCU and Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, and Ph.D. from Michigan State University. During the 2019–20 academic year, I was a visiting scholar at the Harvard-Yenching Institute at Harvard University. I was also a 2025–26 Lenore Annenberg and Wallis Annenberg Fellow in Communication of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford University.
I can be reached at wenchinwu[at]sinica.edu.tw. Here is my CV.
Research interests: Comparative Political Economy · International Political Economy · Comparative Authoritarianism · Chinese Politics
Mobilizing citizens for defense is crucial in international conflicts, as demonstrated by recent events such as the Russia-Ukraine War in 2022. These conflicts highlight the critical importance of citizens’ willingness to fight. However, existing research, including those using the standard question in the World Values Survey (WVS), often overlooks a significant framing issue in measuring this willingness. This study addresses these gaps through theoretical and methodological perspectives. We argue that the way survey questions are framed can significantly influence responses. In particular, a value frame suggesting patriotism would increase willingness to fight, while a cost frame implying war-related costs would decrease it. Through conducting experimental surveys with varied wording on willingness to fight in Taiwan in 2024, we assess the impact of these different frames embedded in questions wordings on responses to willingness to fight between two distinct groups: civilians and military recruits. We also measure the extent of social desirability bias that the value frame may induce. We have two major findings. First, the value frame would induce more willingness to fight while the cost frame dampens it. Second, military recruits display a lower willingness to fight compared to civilians, likely due to their greater awareness of the costs associated with war. This study emphasizes the need for carefully designed surveys and suggests alternative strategies of political communication to enhance the public willingness to fight among various groups, ensuring more accurate assessments of national defense preparedness.
While Western foreign aid often promotes media freedom through conditionality of structural reforms, China has emerged as a major donor offering assistance without such requirements. This article examines how Chinese foreign aid—particularly in the communication sector—affects media freedom in recipient countries. Based on the “aid-for-policy” model, we argue that China facilitates media repression through two channels: by pressuring recipient governments to censor content unfavorable to its interests, and by providing them communication technologies and infrastructures that enable information control. Using panel data from 108 countries between 2000 and 2020, we find that Chinese aid is significantly associated with declines in media freedom in recipient countries. The effect is especially pronounced for communication-related aid and in democratic regimes, suggesting that China’s influence extends even into countries with formal institutional constraints. These findings contribute to the literature on digital authoritarianism, authoritarian diffusion, and the political effects of Chinese foreign aid.
How does income distribution affect citizens’ willingness to defend their country? In this article, I argue that perceived unfair income distribution reduces citizens’ attachment to their country and inhibits their willingness to fight. Using mediation analysis with data collected by the World Values Survey in Taiwan in 2019, I find that perceived distributive unfairness reduces non-rich citizens’ willingness to fight for their country via dampening their national pride, a key element in psychological attachment to national identity. This finding suggests that distributive unfairness threatens national security and contributes to the literature on the perils of economic inequality.
The emerging political economy literature on dictatorial media politics rationalizes the cross-country variation in media freedom by dictators’ demand for truthful information. Since a dictator can always punish the media for their truth-telling ex post, concerns of being punished could induce self-censorship and undermine the dictator’s promise to media freedom. We study a formal model that brings the dictator’s commitment problem to the fore, and characterize situations in which the commitment problem is especially severe. Our analysis suggests that neglecting self-censorship would lead to underestimating the amount of missing information in autocracies as well as overestimating the autocrats’ level of tolerance for criticisms and authoritarian responsiveness. Based on the comparative statics, we contend that the variation in media outlets’ quality and penetration can be leveraged to recover missing information due to self-censorship.
In light of Hong Kong’s failed attempt to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance in 2019 and China’s enactment of the 2020 National Security Law for Hong Kong, many countries have voiced unease about their extradition agreements with China. Some, out of concern over potential adverse impacts on human rights, have even suspended their extradition agreements with Hong Kong. In this article, we investigate factors affecting the signing of extradition agreements between China and other countries. We hypothesize that third countries are more likely to conclude an extradition agreement with China if they are more economically engaged with China or are already cooperating with China in civil and criminal matters. In contrast, countries more strongly committed to the rule of law, or those which maintain a Common Law system, are less likely to sign an extradition agreement with China. Statistical analyses of the 57 Chinese extradition agreements signed between 1993 and 2019 support our hypotheses.
Since 2016, China has been conducting military flybys around Taiwan, while the US has approved arms sales to Taiwan on several occasions and sent warplanes and battleships through the Taiwan Strait. How does Taiwanese public opinion respond to the Chinese and US military presence in the Strait? Is the public likely to become less supportive of \emph{de jure} independence for Taiwan on account of China’s military deterrence or more supportive owing to a perceived likelihood of US military assistance? In this report, we provide answers to these questions based on evidence from a survey experiment conducted in Taiwan in October–November 2020. We find that Taiwanese are less sensitive to the Chinese military presence in the Taiwan Strait but have become more supportive of de jure independence after seeing the US aircraft in the area. Our findings contribute to studies of cross-Strait relations and US foreign policy on the Taiwan Strait.
Taiwan's opposition to PRC demands such as acceptance of the ‘92 Consensus’ and ‘One Country, Two Systems’ formula since 2016 has invited a series of retaliatory measures from Beijing, designed to coerce Taiwan into compliance. Given the stark asymmetry in economic size, military capability, and diplomatic status, Taiwan provides a case for studying coercive diplomacy that takes the form of threats to punish. Material differences suggest that Taiwan should capitulate, and ‘cheap talk’ theses expect PRC threats to have no discernible effect, while balance of threat arguments expect resolve. In this article, we use the survey data collected in the 2016, 2019, and 2020 rounds of the Taiwan National Security Study to examine how Taiwanese respond to China's intensifying and expanding threats. Our paper identifies four strategies that the public sees as responses to PRC coercion: isolation, bandwagon with China, balance against China by allying with the USA and Japan, and hedge by deepening economic ties with China while aligning with the USA and Japan against China. We show that the popular support for balancing against China rises as PRC coercion grows and Taiwanese citizens increasingly perceive China to be a threat. Our findings imply that citizens in a liberal democracy can develop the will to pushback against pressure from an authoritarian regime despite sharp asymmetries in capabilities and material limitations.
Who is more influential in shaping citizens' health-related behaviors, experts or politicians? We conduct five conjoint experiments on 6,255 residents of France, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, asking them to evaluate COVID-19 vaccines alongside randomly varying endorsements from national politicians and medical professionals. In every country, our results show that citizens are more likely to rely on medical professionals, the experts, more than on politicians when choosing a COVID-19 vaccine. Even after accounting for citizens' political alignment with the government, our evidence reveals that politicians play a very limited role in shaping vaccine acceptance. These results have implications for the role of political elites in shaping people's behaviors amid a large-scale crisis.
This paper aims to answer a general question: whether an international organization (IO) is able to shape public opinion in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Since the pandemic took hold in early 2020, countries across the globe have switched gear from prevention to vaccination. Most had to not only secure a sufficient supply of vaccines, but also to curb vaccine hesitancy among their populations. Can endorsement by an international organization like the World Health Organization (WHO) enhance a vaccine’s acceptability? Based on a survey experiment conducted in Taiwan, our study leverages the special relationship between China and Taiwan to show that WHO endorsement can induce acceptance of Chinese vaccines among Taiwanese people. However, the effect is found to be contextual in the sense that it only works when people’s trust in the WHO is higher than their trust in the vaccine’s country of origin. Our study not only contributes to the literature of IO legitimacy by empirically showing IOs’ causal effects on public opinion, but also sheds light on how a vaccine’s credibility can be enhanced to promote vaccination uptake.
Conventional wisdom posits that democracies have more social welfare expenditure than dictatorships because electoral competition induces democratic leaders to adopt social policies in exchange for ordinary citizens’ political support. However, as elections are absent, unfree, and/or unfair in autocracies, the research question in this paper is: How does the distribution of power between dictators and their allies influence welfare spending? This paper discusses the power-sharing structure’s impact on welfare spending based on the theory of power-sharing in authoritarian regimes. When power is less personalized, dictators face the risk of being replaced by other elites. We argue that dictators allocate resources to citizens through welfare policies in exchange for their political support. Increasing personalism rules will reduce welfare spending when power is concentrated on dictators. We test our arguments using time-series cross-sectional data for 90 dictatorships from 1961 to 2006. We find that total welfare spending decreases as the personalization of power of the dictator increases. This effect is robust to different model specifications. This finding helps us to understand the connection between the personalization of power and welfare spending in dictatorships. This paper contributes to the literature by showing that welfare spending is determined by regime leaders’ need for public support as the conventional wisdom suggests, and by the power dynamics within their ruling coalitions in dictatorships.
What types of vaccines are citizens most likely to accept? We argue that citizens' identification with their nation may lead them to prefer vaccines developed and produced within their national borders, to the exclusion and/or detriment of vaccines from other nations. We administered a conjoint experiment requesting 15,000 adult citizens across 14 individual countries from around the world to assess 450,000 profiles of vaccines that randomly varied on seven attributes. Beyond vaccine fundamentals such as efficacy rate, number of doses, and duration of the protection, we find that citizens systematically favor vaccines developed and produced in their own country of residence. The extent of preference in favor of vaccines developed and produced within the national borders is particularly large among citizens who identify more strongly with their nation, suggesting nationalism plays a role in explaining the bias in favor of vaccines developed and produced locally. This public opinion bias on vaccine preferences has significant theoretical and practical implications.
Diplomatic protests convey one government’s displeasure with the policies of another government. Yet public support for their own government’s policies can be influenced by the actions of others, so diplomatic protests have the potential to increase domestic support for the policy within the target country. A rally-’round-the-flag effect has been found to be associated with wars, crises, and sanctions. Here, we assess the existence of such an effect in relation to diplomatic protests by foreign governments. Using a survey experiment, we assess the impact of foreign government protests—specifically protests by China—against U.S. arms sales to Taiwan on public support for Taiwan’s government and its policies. We find that who lodges the protest, whether it is an adversary or supporter, is more important than the language of the protest itself. We argue that diplomatic protests create a dilemma—lodging complaints about the behavior of other governments can increase public support for those very policies in the target country.
This paper examines the logic of human capital formation in authoritarian regimes based on theories of inequality and regime transition and the prospect of upward mobility model. Our central argument is that by investing in human capital, dictators can boost citizens’ perceived levels of social mobility. Consequently, dictators can preemptively ameliorate the pressure for redistribution from the poor and neutralize threats from the masses. In other words, dictators invest in human capital as a way of increasing citizens’ perceived social mobility and thus sustaining political stability in their authoritarian regimes. Our cross-national analysis covers more than 80 authoritarian regimes from 1970 to 2010 and shows that higher levels of education spending are associated with a lower probability of regime breakdown in autocracies. We further use a causal mediation analysis with the Asian Barometer Survey data and connect our causal link from human capital formation to perceived social mobility and then to authoritarian regime support.
This article investigates the relationship between elite power sharing and media freedom in dictatorships. While conventional wisdom posits that dictators have a strong incentive to control the media, they also need information to sustain their authoritarian rule. In this article, we argue that dictators need to allow for a higher level of media freedom when sharing more power with other elites. Specifically, dictators create transparency through media freedom to induce trust and cooperation among elites within the regime. We confirm the hypothesis by analyzing data from 98 dictatorships from 1960 to 2010. Our finding is robust to different model specifications. This article contributes to the literature by showing that authoritarian media freedom is determined by not only dictators' need for local information as the conventional wisdom suggests, but also the power dynamics within their ruling coalitions.
Previous studies have shown that trade politics in the US Congress is determined by congressional partisanship, ideology, and constituents’ economic interests. In this article, I utilize the case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the theoretical perspective of the literature on China’s trade shock to investigate how these three factors affected US congressional representatives’ support for the TPP in 2015. Based on the results of quantitative analysis, this article finds that congressional support for the TPP was determined by partisanship, ideology, and their electoral district’s trade with China. Specifically, Repub-lican and conservative congressional representatives were more likely to support the TPP than Democrats and liberals. Districts importing more from China were more likely to support the TPP. These findings enrich our understanding of trade politics in the US Congress in the age of US-China competition.
This paper evaluates the progress and impact of the literature on comparative authoritarianism, showing not only how its development over the previous two decades can help us understand China’s authoritarian politics better, but also how the latter can move the former forward. We focus on two important topic areas in the literature: authoritarian power-sharing and autocratic politics of information (e.g., partial media freedom and government censorship). For the first topic, we shall review the literature on the authoritarian power-sharing between dictators and their allies and explicate how this conceptual innovation helps us understand the institutional foundation of China’s regime stability and phenomenal economic performance before Xi Jinping. The analysis then provides us a baseline for assessing China’s economic and political future under Xi Jinping given his clear departure from the pre-existing power-sharing framework. Finally, this paper also assesses the relevance of the literature on authoritarian politics of information to the Chinese context. In sum, we not only emphasize the conceptual contributions of the literature of comparative authoritarianism to the field of Chinese politics, but also identify lacunae in the current literature and avenues for future research that post-Xi political developments have made visible to us.
Conventional wisdom posits that intergenerational social mobility reduces individual preference for redistribution. Yet, this thesis is drawn from the case of democracies, where electoral competition plays a key role in redistribution. In this study, we argue that intergenerational social mobility’s effect on individual preference for redistribution differs in dictatorships, where the state is the key decision-maker of redistribution. With the data of the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, we find that citizens’ upward intergenerational social mobility increases with their support for government-led redistribution in autocracies. This finding contributes to the understanding of individual preference for redistribution in dictatorships.
We seek to investigate the impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on coups d’état. We argue that signing PTAs lowers the risk of coups because it acts as a credible commitment of signatory countries to pursuing long‐term economic benefits, which further reduces potential challengers’ incentives to initiate coups. In addition, the effect of PTAs is larger in democracies because democratic signatories are perceived to be more credible in upholding treaty commitments than their authoritarian counterparts. We employ binary time‐series cross‐sectional (BTSCS) models to examine a sample of 154 countries between 1960 and 2012. We find that signing PTAs reduces risks of coups, especially in countries with higher levels of democratic development. Our study sheds light on how PTAs can prolong leader survival through reducing the likelihood of coups and contributes to emerging studies on the consequences of signing PTAs in the age of economic globalization.
Recent studies find that single-party dictatorships are more open to trade due to their larger coalitions than other types of dictatorships. However, this line of research assumes that the preference for trade policies is homogeneous among members of the coalition. This assumption means existing studies fail to explain why single-party dictatorships have more dispersed and complex tariffs rates, an alternative form of protectionism. In this article, I argue that the heterogeneous preferences for free trade among social groups lead to tariff complexity under dictatorships with large coalitions. When dictators need to build larger coalitions, they do not need to exclude all special interest groups but to respond to heterogeneous demands of trade policies in a more selective way. Thus, politicians under single-party dictatorships are more likely to set ad hoc tariffs to favor different members in their coalitions, resulting in complex tariff schedules.
Recent studies revisit the debate over whether tourism promotes peace via intergroup contacts. In this article, we examine the case of China-Taiwan confrontation and argue that the increase of Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan contributes to peace across the Taiwan Strait. Specifically, the touristic experiences and interactions with Taiwanese improve Chinese people’s understanding of Taiwan, fostering a patient and peaceful attitude toward the prospect of cross-Strait relations. With the survey data collected during July and September 2013, we find that Chinese people who were visiting Taiwan for the first time were less likely to support a rapid pace to the unification between China and Taiwan or unification by force than those who had never visited Taiwan. Additionally, the attitude is stronger among independent tourists than those who came in escorted tour groups. Our findings suggest that contacts between tourists and locals are effective in alleviating political tension across the Taiwan Strait.
Concern about rising economic inequality is widespread among ordinary citizens, academics, and policymakers. In particular, income inequality not only intensifies the conflicts between the rich and poor citizens but also leads to political instability. In this article, we investigate how income inequality is related to people’s support for democracy by including both objective and subjective measures of inequality. Using data collected from 28 democracies in East Asia and Latin America during 2013 and 2015, we demonstrate that inequality, measured in either a subjective or objective way, decreases with people’s satisfaction with democracy. In addition, we find that in East Asian countries, subjective measures of inequality, perceived unfairness of income inequality in particular, provide a better explanation of people’s dissatisfaction with democracy than the Gini index, a commonly used objective measure of inequality. Our findings are robust to different model specifications and offer micro-level evidence suggesting that unfair income distribution undermines the consolidation of democracies.
While previous studies find that individual preferences for trade policies are shaped by economic and non-economic factors, it is still unclear whether people’s perception of their government’s role in citizens’ lives affects their attitudes toward free trade. In view of the “developmental state” legacy in East Asia, I investigate how the “big government sentiment” in East Asians’ mindset is associated with their support for protectionism. Based on the data of the third-wave Asian Barometer Survey conducted during 2010 and 2012, I find that when people think that government should bear a major responsibility for the wellbeing of its people, they are more supportive of protectionist policies. This finding contributes to studies of East Asian political economy as well as the formation of individual trade policy preference.
While many studies have investigated Taiwanese people’s attitudes towards cross-Strait relations, few studies explore how Chinese people on the other side of the Taiwan Strait perceive the Taiwan issue. Using data collected via a telephone survey that covers 2,000 respondents from ten major cities in China in 2013, this article presents empirical evidence to fill this gap. It finds that most Chinese citizens’ attitudes are aligned with the government’s propaganda on cross-Strait relations. In particular, Chinese citizens have inaccurate perceptions of Taiwanese support for reunification with China. This article also finds that when Chinese respondents think that the city in which they live is more economically advanced than Taipei, the capital of Taiwan, they would support: (1) a faster pace towards a resolution, and (2) the use of military force to resolve cross-Strait confrontations. These findings offer new perspectives on studies of cross-Strait relations and Chinese nationalism.
Many surveys show that China’s political regime, under the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian rules, enjoys a high level of public support. However, it is still uncertain whether China’s emerging middle class will become the “agent of democratization” as suggested by modernization theory. Using the data of Asian Barometer Survey conducted in China in 2011, this article demonstrates that the relationship between class identity and preference for liberal democracy in China may be inverted U-shaped. The Chinese middle class shows a higher preference to features of liberal democratic regimes than its counterparts of the lower- and upper-class. Members of the Chinese middle class also tend to regard democracy as the best form of government. Thus, the middle class has the potential to initiate democratization in China if the Chinese government fails to keep satisfying the middle class’ quest for economic well-being and protection of property rights.
This paper investigates the political and economic consequences of signing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in authoritarian countries. Based on the Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade and theories of inequality and regime transition, this paper argues that dictators sign PTAs as a means of consolidating their authoritarian rule. Specifically, PTAs help dictators reduce economic inequality by enriching poor laborers and thereby attenuating the threat of regime collapse. We support our theory with the data from seventy-odd authoritarian regimes from 1960 to 2006, and contribute to ongoing debates about the effects of both income inequality and economic globalization on autocratic resilience.
This paper investigates how authoritarian leaders employ trade openness as a response to rising inequality. Based on the Heckscher–Ohlin model of international trade and models of democratic transition, I argue that unskilled laborers in authoritarian regimes can benefit from engaging in international trade, thus becoming more compliant to the authoritarian rules as their countries integrate into the world economy. Therefore, dictators in labor-abundant countries expand trade to neutralize democratization threats initiated by rising inequality. My argument uses supporting data from around eighty authoritarian regimes during the period from 1963 to 2003. I address endogeneity problems with dynamic panel data and instrumental variable regression models in this paper. My analyses suggest that economic globalization helps strengthen authoritarian regimes.
While conventional statistical methods usually assume that the error term in the models are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), this assumption is usually violated when observations are interdependent due to the strategic interactions among players. The violation of the i.i.d assumption results in the inefficient estimation of standard errors that can further invalidate the hypothesis testing. This paper discusses the method of statistical backward induction (SBI) developed by Curtis S. Signorino and his coauthors that can be used to analyze different kinds of strategic interactions in politics, such as electoral competitions, party coalitions, and international conflicts. After demonstrating how to derive the SBI estimator, this paper applies SBI to analyze how the U.S. government uses the Special 301 Report to coerce its trade partners into protecting the intellectual property rights (IPR) of American products. It shows that one country’s trade surplus with the U.S. is a key determinant for the U.S. to nominate this trade partner in the Special 301 Report. Meanwhile, it is the dependence on the U.S. market that affects the nominated country’s decision to ignore or comply with the U.S. threat of trade retaliation implied by the Special 301 Report.
Lai, Ding-Yi, Wen-Cheng Lin, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2024. “The Perils of Chinese Foreign Aid.” In Switching Diplomatic Recognition Between Taiwan and China: Economic and Social Impact, ed. Chien-Huei Wu, 50–69. London: Routledge.
Sheen, Greg Chih-Hsin, Hans H. Tung, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2024. “Commitment and Information Problems in Authoritarian Regimes.” In Research Handbook on Authoritarianism, eds. Natasha Lindstaedt and Jeroen J. J. Van den Bosch, 153–165. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Wu, Wen-Chin, and Hans H. Tung. 2023. “Development and Prospects of Studies on Comparative Authoritarianism in Taiwan.” In Political Science: The State of the Discipline, eds. Chung-li Wu, Wen-Chin Wu, and Nien-Chung Chang-Liao, 157–176. Taipei: Wu-Nan. (In Chinese) 【吳文欽、童涵浦。2023。〈比較威權主義研究在臺灣的發展與前瞻〉，《政治學的現況與展望》，吳重禮、吳文欽、張廖年仲主編：157–176，臺北：五南。】
Chu, Yun-han, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2023. “Sources of Regime Legitimacy in Asian Societies: Evidence from the Fifth Wave of the Asian Barometer Survey.” In How Asians View Democratic Legitimacy, eds. Yun-han Chu, Yu-Tzung Chang, Min-Hua Huang, and Kai-Ping Huang, 67–80. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press.
Wu, Wen-Chin, Yun-han Chu, and Eric C. C. Chang. 2023. “Inequality and Regime Support: Evidence from East Asia.” In How Asians View Democratic Legitimacy, eds. Yun-han Chu, Yu-Tzung Chang, Min-Hua Huang, and Kai-Ping Huang, 44–56. Taipei: National Taiwan University Press.
Huang, David Wei-Feng, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2023. “Taking Sides with the US Against China?—An Analysis of the Taiwanese Choice.” In China-US Competition: Impact on Small and Middle Powers’ Strategic Choices, eds. Simona A. Grano and David Wei-Feng Huang, 275–305. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Fu, Ronan Tse-min, Hsin-Hsin Pan, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2021. “Nationalism, Generalized Trust, and Chinese Citizens’ Attitude toward US Influence.” In China’s New Foreign Policy: Comparative Perspectives from Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, eds. Rumi Aoyama, Suk Hee Han, and Tung-chieh Tsai, 101–124. Taipei: Wu-Nan. (In Chinese) 【傅澤民、潘欣欣、吳文欽。2021。〈民族主義、普遍化信任及中國對美國影響的態度〉，《中國新外交：台日韓三方比較視野》，青山瑠妙、韓碩熙、蔡東杰主編：101–124，臺北：五南。】
This chapter extends the winner–loser gap thesis by analysing how inter-temporal changes in voters’ winner–loser status over time affect their democratic support in emerging democracies. The chapter conceptualizes elections in democracies as repeated games and argue that voters’ democratic attitudes are not just determined by their one-shot winner–loser status alone; instead, voters’ democratic attitudes are determined by their winner–loser status in past elections as well as their expectation for the future. With the CSES II data in six young democracies that experienced government turnover, the chapter shows that winning the current election restores the democratic support among previous losers, and losing the current election may not necessarily result in lower democratic attitudes if those losers had been winners in the previous election. The findings not only advance our understanding of the winner–loser gap thesis pioneered by Anderson and Guillory but also contribute to research on Huntington’s two-turnover test in the democratization literature.
Edited Books
Wu, Chung-li, Wen-Chin Wu, and Nien-Chung Chang-Liao, eds. 2023. Political Science: The State of the Discipline. Taipei: Wu-Nan. (In Chinese) 【吳重禮、吳文欽、張廖年仲主編。2023。《政治學的現況與展望》，臺北：五南。】
Leng, Tse-Kang, Wen-Chin Wu, Yu-shan Wu, and Chien-en Wu, eds. 2019. Sense and Sensitivity of Political Science: Selected Works of Jih-wen Lin. Taipei: Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica. (In Chinese) [Preface] 【冷則剛、吳文欽、吳玉山、吳親恩主編。2019。《政治學的理性與感性——林繼文精選集》，臺北：中央研究院政治學研究所。[編者序]】
Other Publications
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2023. “International Trade and Finance.” In International Relations, eds. Ya-chung Chang and Teng-chi Chang, 341–372. Taipei: Yang-Chih. (In Chinese) 【吳文欽。2023。〈國際貿易與金融〉，《國際關係總論》，張亞中與張登及主編：341–372，臺北：揚智。】
During the outbreak of an epidemic, the success in risk communications to make the public comply with disease preventive measures depends on the public's trust in the government. In this study, we aim to understand how media audiences update their trust in the government during the COVID-19 outbreak depending on the information they received. We conducted an online survey experiment in February 2020 in Hong Kong (n= 1,016) in which respondents were randomly provided with a government press release and an endorsement either from an official or a non-official source. This study shows that the information from a non-official source enhances the credibility of official government messages. Our findings imply that dictators can actually "borrow credibility" from their citizen journalists and even nondemocratic leaders can make themselves more trustworthy to potential dissenters through citizen journalism. Allowing information flow from non-official sources can be a practical measure for governments to address the problem of a credibility deficit during a pandemic.
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2021. “Information Transparency and Effectiveness of Disease Control Measures.” In Reflections on COVID-19, eds. Paul R. Katz and Hsi-yuan Chen, 261–274. Taipei: Academia Sinica. (In Chinese) 【吳文欽。2021。〈疫情訊息透明度與防疫政策成效評估〉，《研下知疫：COVID-19的人文社會省思》，康豹、陳熙遠主編：261–274，臺北：中央研究院出版中心。】
Wu, Wen-Chin, and Tse-Kang Leng. 2019. “Jih-wen Lin’s Research on cross-Strait Relations.” In Sense and Sensitivity of Political Science: Selected Works of Jih-wen Lin, eds. Tse-Kang Leng, Wen-Chin Wu, Yu-shan Wu, and Chien-en Wu, 353–359. Taipei: Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica. (In Chinese) 【吳文欽、冷則剛。2019。〈林繼文的兩岸關係研究〉，《政治學的理性與感性》，冷則剛、吳文欽、吳玉山、吳親恩主編：353–359，臺北：中央研究院政治學研究所。】
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2006. “Breaking the BRICs: On the Local Foundations and Externality of Economic Development in China.” Political Science Quarterly Book Review 10: 13–20. (In Chinese) 【吳文欽。2006。（長篇書評）〈敲開金磚——從四本書談中國經濟運作的地方基礎與外部性問題〉，《政治科學季評》，10：13–20。】
Policy Writings
Wu, Wen-Chin, and Hsin-Hsin Pan. 2025. “Taiwan’s Youth Are Not Defeatist — and The Data Proves It.” The Diplomat. Available at https://bit.ly/4lOVAdg.
Lee, James, Ja Ian Chong, Hsin-Hsin Pan, Chien-Huei Wu, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2023. “The Risks of Ambiguity: Taiwanese Public Opinion, US Credibility, and Effective Deterrence.” Le Rubicon. (English version; French version)
Kagotani, Koji, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2022. “China’s Anger Over Pelosi Visit Will Further Alienate Taiwanese.” The Diplomat. Available at https://bit.ly/3SjVafI.
Pan, Hsin-Hsin, Wen-Chin Wu, and Chien-Huei Wu. 2022. “No Room to Move: Public Opinion in Taiwan Offers Few Options on China.” Global Asia 17(3): 26–41.
Chu, Yun-han, Hsin-Hsin Pan, and Wen-Chin Wu. 2015. “Regime Legitimacy in East Asia: Why Non-Democratic States Fare Better than Democracies.” Global Asia 10(3): 98–105.
Scholarly Communications
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2022. “Those Checkpoints on the Academic Star Map.” Humanities and Social Sciences Newsletter Quarterly 23(3): 104–106. (In Chinese) 【吳文欽。2022。〈那些學術星圖上的關卡〉，《人文與社會科學簡訊》，23（3）：104–106。】
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2020. “The Intellectual Journey of Studying Comparative Authoritarianism.” Humanities and Social Sciences Newsletter Quarterly 22(1): 115–117. (In Chinese) 【吳文欽。2020。〈比較威權主義研究的學思歷程〉，《人文與社會科學簡訊》，22（1）：115–117。】
Videos
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2025. Public Opinion Polls and the Willingness to Fight of the Taiwanese People. (In Chinese) [Link]. 【吳文欽。2025。《從民調看臺灣民眾的防衛意志》。[連結]】
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2024. Proposal Writing. (In Chinese) [Link]. 【吳文欽。2024。《計畫撰寫與審查重點》。[連結]】
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2024. Public Opinion Surveys and the Future of Taiwan-US Relations. (In Taiwanese) [Link]. 【吳文欽。2024。《從民調展望台美關係》。[連結]】
Wu, Wen-Chin. 2021. Sharing of Research Experience. (In Chinese) [Link]. 【吳文欽。2021。《研究經驗分享》。[連結]】
Contact
Emailwenchinwu[at]sinica.edu.tw
Phone +886 2 2652 5329
Affiliation Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica (IPSAS)
Address 128 Academia Road, Sec. 2, Taipei 11564, Taiwan
